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Purpose of Thesis 
This discussion covers the economies and banking sectors of 
Spain and Portugal in relation to those of Mexico. A special 
emphasis is placed on the European Community experiences 
of Spain and Portugal, and the EC's effect on those 
economies as contrasted with the expected effect of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement on Mexico's 
economy and banking sector. Though this comparison, an 
estimation of the success of Mexico's entry to NAFTA will be 
made. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
Current Statistics and Regulations of the Banking System ............................ 3 
Mexico .................................................................................................................. 3 
Portugal ................................................................................................................. 4 
Spain ...................................................................................................................... 5 
Political Past: Socialism and Dictatorship ...................................................... 7 
Spain and Partugal .............................................................................................. 7 
The Spanish Experience ...................................................................................... 7 
The Portuguese Experience ................................................................................ 8 
The Mexican Experience .................................................................................... 8 
Present Government: The move to the Right .............................................. 10 
Mexico ................................................................................................................ 10 
Spain .................................................................................................................... 11 
Portugal ............................................................................................................... 13 
Banking Past and Future ................................................................................ 16 
Banco Central .................................................................................................... 16 
Banco Espirito Santo 8< Comercial de Lisboa ................................................. 19 
Banco Santander ............................................................................................... 20 
Banco Comercial Portuguese .......................................................................... 21 
Summary .......................................................................................................... 23 
r 
Introduction 
As the rest of Europe recovers from a wave of recession, Spain and Portugal have held their ground economically, maintaining one of the 
fastest growing economies in the Economic Community [EC]. 
Mexico experienced a precipitous economic decline during the 
1970's and 1980's, but now stands ready to enter the economic union of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]. Each country is 
embarking on a change in its political, social and industrial institutions 
in order to improve the quality of the domestic economy, and the lives of 
their citizens. 
Fifteen years ago, government squeezed prospects for economic 
progress, yet now the flow of competition from the global marketplace is 
part of the economy, due to past events. 
Spain, Portugal, and Mexico are at distinct economic 
disadvantages with their neighbors and key trade partners. Mexico has 
an economy about one-twentieth the size of the US economy (Wood, 
"Free" S6). Spain's and Portugal's economies, fifth and tenth in the EC, 
are also weaker than neighbors, France and Germany ("Not Quite 
Cousins" 22). 
Post economic instabilities lurk in the shadows. Inflation in all 
three countries still threatens to erupt; unemployment has not declined; 
and interest rates must be better managed if the economy is to be held in 
check. 
The EC played a large role in Spain's and Portugal's turnaround. 
Its economic advice, incentives, and regulations added fuel to the 
countries growths. Competition forced companies and government alike 
to tighten their belts. It brought new meaning to the words "market 
share" and "customer satisfaction" in countries where, before, the 
government, "was always right". 
The banking industry shows the benefits of economic integration 
clearly. Banks consolidate and streamline, while customers benefit, and 
. the counties profit. The success or demise of Spanish and Portuguese 
banks reflect the outcome of Spain and Portugal as a whole. At the same 
time, Mexico can see its future through events in Spain and Portugal as 
NAFTA's wave of deregulation sweeps over the entire economy. 
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A study of the banking industry and the surrounding factors that 
influenced that industry since Spain and Portugal entered the EC in 
1986 will provide insight into the impact that NAFTA will have on Mexico. 
Conditions vary within each country, but common themes in all of them 
make it possible to estimate Mexico's success in NAFTA. 
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Current Statistics and Regulations 
of the Banking System 
Mexico 
Privatization of industries throughout the 1980's into the beginning the 1990's culminated in June, 1991. President Carlos Salinas began a 
thirteen month spree during which he privatized 18 state banks which 
held 98 percent of the assets of the overall banking system. Investors 
paid $12.4 billion for the highly regulated, technologically backward, 
over-staffed banks. Potential growth in Mexico's banking sector was a 
primary factor in their decision (Hennessy FI3). 
By 1989 standards, the ratio of bank branches to potential 
customers averaged 6,000 people to every branch; the US carries ratios 
of 4,000: 1 and Germany's ratios are 1,400: 1. Net interest income of 5.6 
percent of assets in Mexico is well above averages of 3 percent posted in 
Europe and less than 2 percent in Japan (Peagam, "Booming" 512). 
These figures indicate a profitable and growing market. 
Government regulations compounded the effect of the 
nationalization of the Mexican industry in 1982. Financing mounting 
debt in the public sector was a primary concern for the socialist-minded 
government. This policy forced banks to invest in government securities 
and borrow from low interest. government loans. At the same time. 
government forced banks to lend at high interest rates to depositors 
(Wood. "Respect Restored" 53-54). Finally. in 1988 and 1989. the 
government eliminated regulation of interest rates and allowed privatized 
banks to compete on price (Wood. "Big Bang" 516). Special credit lines 
to "priority sectors" in industry were also cut. Legal reserve reqUirements 
of 90 percent which also contributed to government finance were reduced 
to 30 percent ("Suddenly" 24-25). Overall government ownership fell 
dramatically during privatizations in 1991 and 1992 to 8.8 percent 
holdings in Mexico's three most influential banks: Bancomer. Banco 
Servin, and Banco Internacional. Even those shares are expected to be 
sold off soon (Golden C2). 
Regulations limiting foreign and large group ownership continue to 
disappear. As of 1989. foreign investors could own as much as 30 
percent of Mexican banks. Foreign subsidiaries as a group could not 
hold more than 8 percent (Peagam. "Agreement" 26; "The North" 28). 
Domestic industrial and investment groups are also excluded from 
owning more than 5 percent of the capital in an individual bank (Marray 
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165). In enacting these measures, Mexico wanted to prevent foreign 
investment from owning a majority share any Mexican company. It also 
hoped to change the structure of the banking sector. Before 
nationalization, the power of banks and many other industries were held 
by only a few groups. The oligopoly concentrated power in a handful 
investors. With the privatization of 1991, government moved towards 
breaking the monopoly, increasing the number of shareholders from 
8,000 to 130,000 (164). 
Portugal 
The Captain's Revolution of 1975 became the backdrop for the rise of 
socialism in Portugal. Revolution brought a new constitution and 
nationalization of key industries, including banking (Britannica 1059-
1060). Not until almost ten years later, in 1985, did the government 
finally reopen portions of banks to the private sector (Humphreys, 
"Banking" 60). In the meantime, regulations fostering protectionism and 
oligopolistic practices ingrained themselves into the Portuguese 
government policy. Full privatization of larger banks, for instance, was 
hampered by a constitutional dictate created during the 1975 revolution 
which forbade the privatization of "conquests of the revolution ("Inch" 
100)." 
Portugal liberalized the economy during the 1980's. Conforming to 
EC regulations necessitated these changes more often than avoluntartly 
removal of restrictions, however. For example, the central bank has just 
recently slipped out from under the government's thumb. A 1990 statute 
of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism caused the change (Evans, 
"Steering" 142) 
Previously, the central bank was responsible for elements of the 
fiscal and monetary policy, only when their decisions fell "within the 
guidelines" established by the Finance Ministry, but new statues mean 
new freedoms. The central bank now sets policy, "'taking into account' 
government policies. It will, 'collaborate in defining' monetary and 
exchange rate policy and 'keep watch over the stability of the financial 
system' ("Not Quite" 35)". No longer can the economic policy of the 
banking system be the servant of the political whims of the present 
administration. 
The government also stopped providing itself with cheap financing 
through high reserve rates and forced borrowing imposed on banks (36). 
This had also been the case in Mexico. Other times, Portuguese banks 
supported the socialist party program with state-enforced lending to 
state-controlled companies (Blum, "Onwards" 47). Again, rather than 
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being caused by a voluntary desire to open trade, change arose from EC 
rules, as well as competitive pressure in 1993 threatening to crowd out 
banks hampered by uncompetitive regulations, Instead, the government 
now fmances its debt through the sale, on the open market, of treasury 
bills or variable and fIxed-interest bonds ("The Big Sell" 52). 
The impact of the deregulation has been impressive. By freeing 
banks of capital controls, credit controls, and branch opening controls, 
the Portuguese government allowed banks to compete aggreSSively for 
the fIrst time in twenty years. Staffs, which rose by as much as 70 
percent during the reign of nationalizations, fInally started to drop 
("Home Free" 151). Even as the number of branches rose dramatically 
after the 1990 introduction of liberalized rules for new branches, total 
employee counts continue to fall. Labor regulations and unionism have 
slowed progress, but cost effIciencies outweigh the inefficiency of 
unneeded staff ("Not Yet" 97). 
Portugal is still under-banked by EC standards at one branch per 
4,000 people. Room for profits is available, but net interest income has 
fallen, down from 6 percent in 1991 to just 4.5 percent in 1992 (97). 
Restrictions on foreign ownership of state companies limit foreign 
entry into the Portuguese market to approximately 25 percent of any 
company. Policy changed in 1993, however, when the EC removed 
Portugal's restrictions on the flow of capital. Foreign capital now 
supplements the scant supply of local capital. Sales of bonds, 
international loans, and development funds support the government's 
infrastructure program and debt financing, obligations to which 
domestic banks were once held (Humphreys, "Portugal Plumps" 106). 
Spain 
Problems with regulations and effIciency in Spanish banks may as severe 
as with Portugal or Mexico. The unorthodox nature of the market, 
though, served as a natural barrier to foreign entry in the short run. 
The unusually high ratio of banks to people, one for every 1,200, 
makes economies of scale too costly to achieve by foreign investors 
("Already" 94). Nevertheless, Spain has also had its fair share of 
regulations with which to keep out foreigners. It invoked a three-branch 
limit for foreign banks, increased that number to eight branches per 
bank, and then eliminated the limit entirely in 1993. The retail banking 
market also slowly removed protections by phasing out a 40 percent limit 
on the share of deposits that foreign banks can obtain from that market 
(94). 
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Even with protective regulations, banks continue to struggle to 
emerge strong enough to compete with the rest of the EC. The very 
regulations that protected them, other inefficient industries, and the 
economy as a whole, have slowed down banks. Up until around 1985, 
banks still had to invest 50.5 percent of all their deposits into one of 
three areas: government debt, the central bank, or nationalized 
industries (94). Happily, by 1993, the government made a strategic 
about-face, enacting accounting rules that prohibited exposure to 
industry through loans and investment to 40 percent, 20 percent by 
1999 (Parry, "Conde's" 66). 
Costs, stemming from high labor costs and poor technology, cut 
into margins that now rest at about 4.5 percent ("The Best" 79). Lifted 
regulations will only help cut margins further to the EC average, as 
mergers and competitive forces impact the Spanish market that has been 
an oligopoly of the state for so long. Deregulation of interest rates in 
1987 may also help to maintain some of the profits. Growth in lending 
(credit) ceilings and reserve requirements, lifted in 1991 and 1990 
respectively, will also contribute to greater efficiencies and economies of 
scale ("Serenading" 66; Evans, "Looking" S2). 
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Political Past: 
Socialism and Dictatorship 
Spain and Portugal 
Problems with Spain's and Portugal's integration into the EC stem from a history that encouraged many of the poor habits that the countries 
are today trying to break. 
So much of their history is shared: the legacy of exploration 
and empire; the manipulation by greater powers in the 
eighteenth century; the comic-opera procession of 
incompetent kings, libidinous queens, rebellious uncles and 
military strongmen in the nineteenth; above all the 
frustrations of rule by Western Europe's only post-1945 
dictators. 
("Not Quite Kissing Cousins" 24) 
The Spanish Experience 
General Francisco Franco made his own contributions to the decline and 
ultimate revival of the Spanish state. During the 1930's until World War 
II, civil war, near famine, and state-controlled industry, cut national 
incomes to the point that they returned to levels present in 1900. 
Economic protectionism also contributed to Spain's decline. Franco's 
alliance with the Axis powers during World War II further emphaSized 
Spain's isolationism, even though Spain depended on the Allies for food 
and oil. Western opposition was unsustainable, though, because of 
Franco's strategic pOSition in the balance of the Cold War. 
In 1953, a shift from a state controlled economy to a market 
controlled one led the country out of decades of economic stagnation. 
Economic growth shot up as did inflation and wages. These factors, and 
the decision of an aging Franco to begin a transfer of his power, led to an 
opening of the country and its political system. Franco developed 
legislative and executive branches of government and hand picked a 
successor to chief of state. In 1975, Franco's era ended with his death 
on November 20 and Juan Carlos became the king of Spain (Britannica 
58). 
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The Portuguese Experience 
Portugal's history was no less turbulent than that of Spain. Antonio de 
Oliveira Salazar influenced Portuguese politics from 1928 until his death 
in 1970. After taking over the Ministry of Finance in 1928. he became 
prime minister in 1932. steering his country through World War II and 
much of the latter half of the century. During his reign. Salazar created 
a new constitution. government structure and plans for economic 
development that held throughout his tenure. 
Not until after his death did opposition within the governing 
National Assembly. economic crisis. and colonial policy in Mozambique 
and Angola undermine the government. The 1974 Captain's rebellion 
consisted of a core 200 service captains whose primary objective was to 
end the long. costly wars that vainly attempted to continue Portuguese 
control of the African colonies. 
A brief period of communist rule followed from 1974 to 1976. but a 
new constitution quickly replaced them. completing the country's shift to 
democratic socialism. A number of governmental variations on the same 
socialist theme followed. In 1983. Mario Soares' Socialists held a 
coalition government with the Social Democrats long enough to 
implement a program to control the severe economic problems plaguing 
Portugal. After an 18 month emergency program and a four-year 
modernization program. Portugal gained admittance into the EEC in 
1986 (Britannica 1059-1060). 
The Mexican Experience 
Porfirio Diaz's rule closely resembled that of Salazar and Franco. From 
1876 to 1911. he dominated Mexico. He emphasized economic 
development through a policy of "pan a palo" (bread or the club). This 
meant that conforming to his government would guarantee a livelihood. 
even prosperity. but objection would just as surely guarantee 
harassment. imprisonment. or death. With such a system. Diaz 
established a stable economy that attracted foreign investment for the 
construction of infrastructure and. most importantly. oil production. 
The success of the Diaz regime ultimately led to its demise. A 
growing middle class. cleansed by years of relative prosperity. forgot the 
suffering before Diaz and began to question the need for total obedience 
to a dictatorship. Acts of opposition brought acts of repression onto the 
Mexican people. which only enflamed revolutionary sentiments. By 
1911. enough citizens had joined former presidential candidate turned 
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revolutionary. Francisco I. Madero. to overthrow the aged. inefficient 
government and army. The country continued to wage civil war until a 
constitution could be written in 1917. 
Relative calm fell over Mexico after 1917. Power passed 
successfully until 1928. when the assassination of the next president 
caused the incumbent. Plutarco Elias Calles to form the single party 
system run by the National Revolutionary Party. This system. more than 
the Diaz regime. resembled the leftist governments of Spain and Portugal 
under Franco and Salazar. 
Under General Lazaro Cardenas' presidency in 1938. the Mexican 
government nationalized the petroleum industry. These and other 
actions effectively removed foreign power from Mexico. It also began the 
process of economic slowdowns. due largely to socialist reforms on the 
part of Cardenas. 
The US and Mexico resolved hostile relations during World War II 
and Mexico benefited from smooth political and economic progress for 
the next thirty years. During this time. the National Revolutionary Party 
changed its name to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRl). 
Ironically. international loans used to finance the economy during 
the 1970's eventually led to the near bankruptcy of the state-a state 
that so adamantly opposed foreign influence earlier in the century. The 
government assumed that they would pay for the nearly $80 billion in 
loans with the revenues gained from oil production of reserves found in 
the Tabasco and Chiapas states in 1976. Unfortunately. sharply falling 
oil prices in the early 1980's made payment of even the interest on the 
debt impossible. Presidents Jose Lopez Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid 
Hurtado feverishly combated a period of triple digit inflation. high 
unemployment. and flight of Mexican capital abroad. 
Austerity measures. such as the nationalization of the country's 
banks and foreign currency controls set in place in the 1970's and early 
80·s. took nearly a decade to make an impact. Not until the election of 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1988 did Mexico emerge from the "lost 
decade" (Britannica 45-47; Wood. "Respect Restored" S4). 
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Present Government: 
The move to the Right 
Mexico 
A s Mexico's inflation rates returned from its vacation at the stratospheric level of 159 percent in 1987 to a more sedentary 12 
percent in 1989, President Salinas did what that last two preSidents had 
been unable to do; get to work (Wood, "Respect Restored" S3), The 
impetus the Salinas government's strategy is his vision that the world is 
forming into several distinct trade blocks. Mexico must join if it wishes 
to continue growing (S4). Foreign entry capital, this time in the form of 
investments, competition, and advice rather than loans, is essential, 
hence Mexico's push for NAFTA. 
The singular nature of the government helped make Salinas' vision 
a reality. Without strong opposition, the PRJ pushed through tough 
reform legislation that may otherwise have caused an electoral ousting. 
Indeed, many believe that the PRJ fIxed the 1988 election in order to 
prevent an opposition party win. Fortunately, Mexico began to receive 
some of the benefIts from the years of strict monetary policy just in time. 
GDP growth is finally increasing at a rate of 2-3 percent annually 
(Peagam, "Booming" SI2). Part of the timeliness is due to the dirty job of 
austerity measures undertaken by the previous presidents, but credit 
must also be reserved for the current administration and its depth of 
talent. 
Aided by a circle of ministers boasting-as he does-post-
graduate degrees in economics from America's best 
universities, the president has been able to transform the 
country. Mexico probably has the most economically literate 
government in the world. It is certainly one of the few 
countries where the economics profession is still revered 
rather than held in contempt. 
(Wood, "Respect Restored" S4) 
Under Salinas and his crew, the government deficit fell from a 
frightening level of 16 percent of the GDP in 1987 to a surplus of 1 
percent in 1992. The $12.4 billion raised during privatizations of banks, 
plus the money earned in other similar measures with other industries, 
cut outstanding public-sector debt to 39 percent of the GDP, a full 20 
percent lower than the debt fIgures in the US and Japan (S3). These 
measures encouraged confIdence from both domestic and foreign 
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investors. Since it began refonns of the government and banking system, 
about $4 billion in flight capital has returned to Mexico, along with $20 
billion in new foreign capital in 1991 alone (Hennessy FI3). 
Fear of US domination is another, more subtle, hurdle that the 
Salinas government successfully cleared before NAFrA. Mexico and its 
people now envision themselves as an up and coming player in the 
international arena; its dependence on the US for capital fonning a 
fraternal rather than a paternal bond (Wood, "Respect Restored" S4). 
The government itself may be a final obstacle in the way of an 
economic victory for Salinas. The enonnous multitude of laws and 
decrees created by the state since its conception hampered efforts to 
Swiftly make changes necessary for economic refonn. Thus, refonn 
within the government was necessary. In 1989, Salinas chose Santiago 
Levy, a technocrat in the Salinas administration and an economics 
professor at the private Mexican university, ITAM, to head the office of 
deregulation. The office set about clearing up the cobwebs of 
bureaucracy that cluttered the Mexican state for over 70 years (Wood, 
"House Cleaning" SI8). 
The domestic trucking market is a prime example of the 
deregulatory office at work. Company freight costs fell by 25 percent as 
the office lifted price controls and restrictions on the market. Levy also 
removed rules forCing trucks to travel empty of cargo because they could 
or couldn't load freight at certain points. 
Cleverness of Senor Levy's caliber remains markedly absent 
outside the government, though. Years of statism and anti-capitalist 
sentiments placed undue importance on jobs in the government, drawing 
the best and brightest to the public sector, leaving the private sector with 
a marginal worker pool (SI9). The government managed to suck the 
economic wealth of the country up for itself in the past. In 1988, the 
government used over 50 percent of available credit, but that is quickly 
changing. Those figures dropped to only 15 percent in 1992 ("Suddenly" 
25). The real crime is the theft of intellectual wealth from the fmancial 
and industrial sector, an asset not so easily replaced (Wood, "House 
Cleaning" SI9). 
Spain 
The relative political stability of Mexico from the 1920's until the 1970's 
contributed to the quickness of the government's turnaround in the 
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1980's. Spain and Portugal political positions were more precarious 
when the economic troubles of the 1970's began. 
As Juan Carlos began his term as king of Spain, he found himself 
responsible for the enviable yet ominous task of reforming the 
government into a full democracy. Within two years, a minority 
government formed, immediately initiated reforms, and created a new 
constitution. Members of the Civil Guard threatened the delicate 
beginnings of democracy, however. when they attempted a military coup 
in 1981. Juan Carlos personally intervened during the crisis, cutting 
short the overthrow attempt. As a result. the event served to strengthen 
the position of both Carlos and the government. 
The final test came during the elections of 1982. when a socialist 
majority beat the original minority government. Governmental power 
changed hands peacefully. and the new administration began attacking 
problems of the state. 
The swiftness with which Mexico is switching to a market driven 
economy is unparalleled in Spain. Unfortunately. the price of democracy 
is often democracy. Fear of upsetting voters, or worse. having voters lose 
their jobs. challenge any change and harsh cuts necessary to reform 
both the economy and the banking sector. Only EC regulations or 
competition can force deregulation and improvements in the economy to 
occur. 
Entry into the EC and, more recently, entry into the Economic 
Monetary Union now underlies any motivation for economiC reform. 
Government's focus concentrated on achieving the four economic goals 
set forth by the Maastricht treaty and conforming to full integration of 
capital, labor. goods. and services by 1993. The efforts lowered inflation 
rates and disproportionately raised interest rates in order to keep the 
exchange rate within its band. In return. the economy slowed. caused by 
steps taken that have sometimes been detrimental to the banking 
industry (Spain "Will" C7). 
One tactic for meeting debt ratios and exchange rates for 1993 
involved forcing banks to place 30 percent of borrowing in foreign credit 
into the central bank. even though the banks paid interest on the total 
amount. One foreign bank complained, "We're all having to pay for the 
fact that the Bank of Spain does not know how to control its exchange 
rate. It's a Third World-type move ("Knock" 65)." 
Financing the public deficit by making Spanish banks buy 
treasury bills with 10 percent of all deposits and enforCing an unusually 
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high reserve requirement has also hurt banks. Before EC integration 
removed the requirements. Private Banking Association chairman Rafael 
Termes argued against the restrictions by saying. "If the government got 
rid of the T-bill ratio and reduced to a reasonable level the reserve 
requirement. it could stop worrying about the banks' capacity to compete 
with the EEC. because banks would take care of the rest (Chislett. 
"From Minnows" 67)." 
Fortunately for the banking sector. the competition of 1993 took 
these tools out of the hands of the Spanish government. EC freedom of 
capital requirements gave Spain no choice but to lift credit restrictions 
and limits on foreign borrowing. unless it wished for foreign competition 
to overwhelm its banks (Chislett. "No End" 41). From now on. for the 
government to control debt. it will have to reduce costs. not increase 
revenue. To reduce inflation. interest rates. and stay within the ERM. it 
will have to control its money supply. not its banks. 
Portugal 
The coalition government under Mario Soares' Socialists and the Social 
Democrats lasted long enough to gain admittance into the EEC. The 
Socialists fell soon afterwards. in 1985. Anibal Cavaco Silva. leader of 
the right wing. became head of the Social Democrats. Amidst nationwide 
strikes and political demonstrations calling for an end to the coalition 
government. the Social Democrats became the largest single party in 
Portugal. Cavaco Silva became the prime minister. and Soares became 
the first civilian president of Portugal in 60 years. 
The move by Silva in 1985 cemented many of the goals of the 
previous administration to join the EC. The idea of a free market 
economy. once so foreign to Portugal. had now become a priority. 
Trouble with implementing a plan for such a goal begins and ends with 
that same inexperience with the system. Government and industrial 
structure are still struggling to adapt to the free market system. 
A Significant trouble with the government of Portugal. as with 
Mexico. is the staggering number of laws and regulations that overlap 
and slow down attempts for change. Whereas Mexico chose to cut out 
. the regulations. Portugal chose to add more. In the fmancial sector. for 
example. a White Book contains the codified changes for the fmancial 
sector. In one section. credit institutions are broken down into three 
main categories: state-owned companies; commercial and investment 
banks; and specialized credit institutions. Any new law in the White 
Book ends the legal power of any old laws. 
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Such a concept for reform is very representative of the Latin 
culture of all three countries. Codified law is a practice of southern 
Europe, existing since Roman times and solidified through the 
Napoleonic codes. By its nature, such law produces inflexibilities and 
because of its resistance to change, slows down procedures as the rules 
set down by the legislatures become antiquated. This type of legal 
system impeded efforts to move away from the state controlled economy. 
The codes fIrst necessitated the development of new codes in the 
legislature before they could take effect. Also, the character of the 
codified law sank into the culture of the Latin people. 
To a degree, this form of law, along with the centrist history of the 
countries, encouraged dependence on the state for initiative and support 
throughout any commercial endeavor. The dependence then encouraged 
the state to make more rules concerning the conduct of business. In 
addition, the idea of changing the system and mind set of the people is 
an awesome one, considering the lack of desire to change and the 
potential hardships that change can incur. 
As a result, until recently, the use of banks to affect the monetary 
policy continued to be a favorite tool of the Portuguese government. 
Reserve requirements at 1 7 percent and severe foreign currency 
limitations cut the competitiveness of banks. Low interest assets and 
bad loans to public enterprises in the past also hurt, but provided easy 
money for the state. Credit ceilings most hurt smaller private banks and 
foreign banks because they couldn't produce the high capitalization and 
volume of long-term deposits necessary to turn a profit (Blum, 
"Energizing" 51). Banks have tried to get around restrictions, but 
government undermined their efforts. 
The two-monthly credit ceilings are now enforced every two 
weeks. "Before everyone knew what to do," says Carlos de 
Frias, a senior officer of Banco Commercial Portuguese in 
Lisbon. "At the beginning of every two-month period, every 
bank would lend aggressively and then call the loans in 
before the end of the period to satisfY the regulations. You 
can't do that with fortnightly ceilings." 
(Evans, "Late Frost" 67) 
"The new rules seriously distort the market," complains 
Rodrigues. "The fmancial system is modeled around one 
basic need: funding the government's huge defIcit. All the 
regulatory jargon is used just to try and disguise this fact." 
(68) 
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The Portuguese state is less able than the Spanish to lose the 
socialist views which have held back its industries for so long. 
Regardless of their view, the EC removed restrictions on foreign and 
domestic banks by the end of 1992 (Warner 14). 
Public debt is a major factor influencing the continued policy, as is 
inflation. The public sector debt/GDP ratio is still above acceptable 
levels stipulated by the Maastricht treaty for monetary union. Inflation 
neared double the European average in 1992, due in part to the 
governments determination to keep the escudo in the ERM system. 
Since then, it has sunk to 6.3 percent. Unemployment, unlike Spain's 
20 percent, is at a respectable 4.5 percent (Kochan 135; Humphreys, 
"Portugal Plumps" 103-104). 
Without help from EC infrastructure inflows, the situation would 
probably be considerably worse. In December 1992, the European 
council doubled the structural funds entering Portugal until 1999. 
Inflows from that source alone accounted for 3.5 percent of the GDP in 
1992, and sustained the GDP for the country between 1986 and 1992 at 
3.8 percent, 1.2 percent above the EC average, Spain receives similar 
funds and both also receive money from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Even with the inflows, recession 
and tighter policies reduced the GDP to less than 2 percent in 1993 
(103-104), 
Significantly affecting both Portugal and Mexico, is its size in 
relation to the rest of the EC, especially its neighbor Spain. In terms of 
the size of the economy, Spain ranks fifth-largest in the EC, while 
Portugal is tenth. Portugal is also geographically isolated from the rest of 
Europe by its position to the west of Spain, Thus, it is dependent on its 
roads, rai!, and electricity grid to contact the EC by land. Spain has 
consistently dominated trade and investment between the two. Although 
the trade gap is narrowing, Portugal still had to pay $1.1 billion for the 
40 percent of imports not covered by its exports in 1989 ("Not QUite 
Kissing Cousins" 21-22). Such a position poses a threat to a government 
and people whose ideas of nationalism are still strong, 
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Banking 
Past and Future 
Concrete comparisons can be made between the Iberian countries' and Mexico's political and economic structure. All three countries 
experienced economic slowdowns under state-controlled economies. 
As controls lessened, economic growth expanded, but each 
experienced a crisis during the 1970's into the 1980's: a period marked 
by high inflation and a build-up of public debt. Nationalization occurred 
around this time, and banks became heavily regulated. State control 
greatly reduced the efficiency and the financial health of the 
organizations as bad loans and over-staffing became the norm. 
Restrictions on banks contributed to downturns. Government severely 
limited banks' decision-making capacity and ability to evolve beyond the 
limits of a state enterprise. 
Several years after the privatization of banks in Spain and 
Portugal, the banks took the opportunities that a liberalized economy 
gave them and developed strategies unique to each other. Each of the 
banks carried different strategies to enter adapt to the EC. The 
strategies depended on an element of each of four main categories 1.) 
the size of the bank; 2.) the type of bank; 3.) the management that took 
over the bank when it was privatized; and 4.) the type of demanding 
clientele. 
More subtle variations exist, but in order to make a comparison of 
the effect of liberalization of markets on the banking sector. The most 
extreme, characterizing parts of each category serve as the best models. 
Four banks from the Iberian peninsula each achieved a degree of 
success, employing markedly different strategies, each from a different 
background. The four are Banco Central of Spain; Banco Espirito Santo 
& Comercial de Lisboa (BESCL) of Portugal; Banco Santander of Spain; 
and Banco Comercial Portugues of Portugal (BCP). 
Banco Central 
As much as BCP represents the modem capitalist version of a bank, 
Banco Central represents banks at the height of nationalization. The 
sheer size of Banco Central's 2,800-branch system demonstrates the 
attributes of a national champion. During the mid-1980's, Banco 
Central was the largest bank in Spain with domestic operations 
employing over 24,000 employees and carrying 2,900 branches. 
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Industrial holdings are vast even today. A current market value estimate 
is Ptas300 billion (Sington, "Spain's Sluggard" 62-64). 
Inefficiency is another hallmark of Banco Central and its 
employees. Information and credit-risk analysis systems are considered 
antiquated and employee productivity is low, as are employee salaries. 
In terms of operating cash flow on ATA, Central staff 
recorded little more than ptas4 million a head in 1989, 
dividends included. Santander staff recorded Ptas6.7 million 
and Popular staff 7.4 million. Says one analyst: "Central 
staff aren't good, but they're cheap." 
(64) 
Return on assets [ROA] isn't much prettier. Against the 2.51 
average ROA of the Spain's seven largest banks, Central rates 0.47 
percentage pOints below. With non-banking business excluded, the 
figures drop to 1.89 percent, which is 0.62 points below that average. 
Septuagenarian Alfonso Escamez Lopez takes full responsibility for 
the results of his bank. His presidency lasted almost two decades. His 
rule was one of a strong-man. In his administration, delegating is 
minimal and directing is maximal. 
Escamez controls everything he thinks important, .. says a 
senior Spanish banker, "including all the biggest clients. 
Valls [president of Banco Popular] only controls the clients 
who get into trouble, to decide when credit should be 
stopped.... At Banco Central any kind of important decision 
will be taken by the chairman.... Management moves like an 
elephant. 
(62) 
With a record like Banco Central's, it's a wonder that it is even 
operating, but Escamez has a plan, and so far it is working against the 
odds. 
When the Spanish government finally released the banking sector 
from the many financial controls it had placed on banks during 
nationalization, most were quick to divest themselves of the burden of 
industrial loans and minimize industrial holdings. Some, like Banesto, 
sold struggling industrial assets in order to maintain profitability and 
conform to new ceilings limiting a bank's exposure to industry from 40 
percent of equity to 20 percent over six years (Parry, "Will" 136). 
Karyn E, Guse Page 17 May. 1994 
Banco Central has no such problems. Industrial holdings, such as 
Compania Espanola de Petroleos and Autopistas del Mare Nostrum, are 
among the healthiest and most profitable in their sector, constituting 
almost 3 percent of the Spanish GDP ("Spanish Merger" 7;). Although in 
the medium term they may falter, in the long term, Central can hold out 
until economic prosperity returns (Sington, "Spain's Sluggard" 66). 
In the end, the greatest asset Banco Central owns may be Escamez 
himself. The unorthodox strategies that he believes in may be the very 
ones that have kept Central in the running so long. The balance is a 
precarious one though. Much is dependent on the unique relationship 
he holds with the clients of the bank. The majority are retail clients with 
low-incomes and basic needs, reached by the vast network of branches 
in some of the poorer parts of Spain. A corporate commercial market, 
capital gains, dividends, and low-yielding loans from industrial holdings, 
and foreign loans also helped support the resulting low profitability (61-
62). 
All of this is just fine with Escamez. This is a point he proved 
when Banco Santander instigated a deposit war by offering high interest 
rates on the supercuentas, Banco Central did not bite. Instead, Central 
maintained its current strategy and emerged relatively unscathed. Client 
base was again a major reason for the strategy's success. Interest on 
supercuentas only paid to customers who held several million pesetas in 
the accounts, which Central's low-income clients didn't have. Also, 
competition was the driving force behind the war. In most cases, 
Central's branches only have one local competitor, so competitive 
incentives are not needed (65-66). 
His strategy has complemented his philosophy well. Escamez is 
still of the socialist school of first serving the community and the 
country, and lastly serving the margin and the shareholder. 
He thinks of the bank as a service to the citizen, as a tool to 
drive forward projects, to get businesses on their feet, to 
make things. The concept is of a bank that serves others. 
The bank that helps. And to work better it is necessary to 
grow. In branches, in resources, in people. 
(63) 
This is a goal that Escamez has achieved with zeal. From the time 
as head of the international department, he built up foreign branches, 
especially Latin American countries, to the point where Central's assets 
account for a little less than 20 percent of Spain's global total assets. 
Mergers at home have also been his responsibility. As director-general, 
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he handled takeovers of five banks. and as head. he took over an 
additional three Spanish banks. making it the largest bank in Spain by 
the 1980's (63). 
Nevertheless. the traditional era of Banco Central drew to a close. 
In 1991. Banco Hispano Americano merged with Banco Central to form 
Banco Central Americano. With it. a new management style emerged 
along with a more transparent accounting criteria. Under Central, the 
bank often used accounting ruses to improve numbers in the profit -loss 
account. Another favorite trick was to sell shares in industrial holdings 
to the company's subsidiaries at book value. The subsidiaries then sold 
them on the market and paid dividends to Central with the capital gains. 
who incorporated them into net income (Chislett "No End" 42). For an 
instant. though. Alfonso Escamez Lopez made the old ways work for him. 
Other banks are proving that privatization can bring new 
opportunities. change. and profit. Banco Espirito Santo & Comercial de 
Lisboa and Banco Santander are cases in point. Still. each has created a 
different. successful approach. 
Banco Espirito Santo & Comercial de Lisboa 
Before the nationalizations in 1975. Group Espirito Santo was one of the 
powerful banking families of Portugal. Revolution brought exile to the 
family. but not an end to the hopes of one day buying back from the 
government the bank that it had founded. 
[Between 1975 and 1992] the family bought stakes in banks 
in London. Paris (SOCiete Bancaire de Paris) and Brazil. They 
have a stake in a bank in the US (Espirito Santo Bank of 
Florida), a fund management company in Lausanne. and 
their holding company is based in Luxembourg. Shortly 
after returning to Portugal, the group bought Banco 
Industrial del Mediterraneo. a small Spanish bank with a 
group of branches close to the Portuguese border. 
("Home Free" 151) 
In addition. Group Espirito Santo re-bought its old insurance 
company. Tranquilidade and purchased an investment bank. ESSI. a 
broker. ESER, and a private bank Banco Internacional de Credito (150). 
Size ranks BESCL (Portuguese banking section only) as the third 
largest retail and commercial bank in assets. and second in terms of 
profitability. Of the $15 billion holding company. Group Espirito Santo. 
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BESCL is the largest asset at $11.6 billion. It captures 7.5 percent of the 
deposits and 8 percent of the loans in Portugal (151). 
Part of the present success of BESCL is attributable to wise 
management during nationalization. The system and credit policy of the 
bank before nationalization remained much the same. Management kept 
government loans and bad risks to a minimum. Conservatism still 
reigns at BESCL. Growth in credits for the system as a whole rose 22 
percent in 1991. but only 17 percent for Espirito Santo. Loans and 
investment have also been slow to accumulate. BESCL is extremely 
cautious about the risk of economic crisis in Portugal. 
Technology and work force were the only major drawbacks to arise 
out of nationalization. Staff grew from 4,000 to 6,800 and people per 
branch rose to 29. An increase in the number of branches helped reduce 
this number to 27, along with a cut in staff to 6,000. Heavy investment 
in information technology also brought the bank up to date. 
Espirito Santo was aggressive in recruiting help from outside the 
company to develop management strategy. Through management 
consultants McKinsey Company, and French bank Credit Agricole, who 
as a friendly investor holds a 20 percent stake in the company, BESCL 
has developed both ESSl and itself. For ESSI. it took a leading role in 
the increasingly important project finance and corporate finance sector 
in Portugal. Its projects include the fmancing of the Pego power station 
project, gas projects, and the new bridge over the River Tagus. 
BESCL also used the two advisors to develop skills and strategies 
to draw in the private client. Cross-selling is a major success between 
insurance company, Tranquilidade, and the bank. The bank now sells 
about 66 percent of the life products of the insurance company. Credit 
Agricole also earned an additional $4 billion a year for BESCL by 
introducing them to the business of moving emigrants' remittances from 
France to Portugal (lSI). 
Espirito Santo took a traditional banking family and adapted it 
from rural roots to the growing needs of the Portuguese economy. Banco 
Santander did much the same thing in Spain, but with a riskier edge. 
Banco Santander 
The deposits war waged by Spain's biggest banks in September of 1989, 
was widely know as the victory of Banco Santander's; a masterful display 
of what aggressive marketing and high risk can reward. Through the 
introduction of the high-yield supercuenta. Santander increase its market 
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share of total deposits by 50 percent, from 3.5 percent to 5.2 percent. In 
16 months, it captured 15 percent of total new deposits. Average cost of 
deposits rose from 7.33 percent to 8.51 percent. Staff rose by 1.493, but 
consolidated pre-tax profits rose by 18.25 percent to Pta96.1 billion 
("Well Placed" 18). 
We thought that someone would do it sooner or later. From 
international analysis, we thought the one that struck first 
would be the winner. The only risk was that somebody else 
would jump first. 
(Evans, "Leaders" 29) 
The goal of Banco Santander is market share at the expense of 
operating profits, which fell by 5.6 percent. Asset soundness also 
tempers the aggressiveness. As with Mexico, Spain's banking criteria are 
remarkably high, but Santander's capital-adequacy ratios are higher 
than those criteria at around 13%, and higher than the '85 minimum set 
by Basel's Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for 1993 at 8% 
(Chislett, "No End" 41-42). 
At this moment, Santander is extremely well placed. It is the fifth 
largest and most technologically advanced of the banks of Spain. Its 
branches eliminate paperwork with fully computerized links to national 
and regional offices. Its number of employees per branch is low at 9.7 
(Chislett, "Changing the Rules" 62; Sington, "Defending EI Dorado" 53). 
Despite enormous consolidated assets increased by the 
supercuentas, domestic mergers are not in the cards. Banco Santander's 
focus is on establishing an international network. It is already in 
collaboration with the Royal Bank of Scotland, and has acquiSitions in 
West Germany, Belgium, and Italy. Santander also created jOint-
ventures, the most profitable being an Anglo-Spanish operation, Banco 
NatWest March (55). 
Banco Comercial Portuguese 
Banco Comercial Portuguese has the final bank strategy. As a newly 
formed Portuguese bank in 1986, it had capital of Esc3.5 billion and staff 
of 255. By 1991, it had grown to 2,500 employees and had capital of 
Esc66 billion. 
Youth and risk are the primary assets of BCP. The average age of 
employees at BCP averages 30, 10 years lower than the industry average 
(Humphreys, "Banking" 60-61). Its gains are largely due to faster, more 
efficient services available through modern techniques and the use of 
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computers (Blum, "Onwards" 48). Also in the formula for success is its 
entry into the retail market of Portugal, a sector dominated by large and 
inefficient banks, previously owned by the state (Evans, "Late Frost" 68-
69). With this strategy, BCP is able to avoid much of the foreign 
competition that is slowly taking over the wholesale banking sector. 
If BCP runs a retail strategy it should be able to compete. 
They know this place and while a foreigner can get to know it 
well, it would have to be very sharp to beat them . . . 
(Shreeve 97) 
A potential problem forming with BCP is the possibility of non-
performing loans associated with the high risk, high growth strategy it 
has taken. ''The worry is that in their scramble to put on weight, the 
banks are giving credit to anyone who can sign a contract," says one 
Portuguese banker. This may be the case, but for right now, success is 
in the hands of BCP. 
(Humphreys, "Banks" 114) 
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Summary 
E ach of the four banks just cited represents a potential marketing strategy for Mexican banks as the Mexican economy evolves into a 
liberalized economy. Other factors may take effect. Government policy 
such as the new worker pension fund scheme will provide Mexican banks 
with a dramatic growth in deposits (Laurie 43). Inevitably. foreign banks 
will enter the economy. This is one of the goals of NAFfA. More 
important to the success or failure of the Mexican banks will be the 
decisions made by its own government. 
Economic downturns are just beginning to hit the Spanish and 
Portuguese markets. As businesses fail, profits fall, and foreign products 
overtake some domestic ones, the temptation is for government to 
intervene, to protect. Inflation and unemployment may grow severe 
enough before disinflation and wage moderation sinks in that political 
pressure could force a reversion to old policies. 
Mexico is protected to an extent by the dominance of the single 
political party, the PRI. Election of the next president in 1994 is almost 
guaranteed, given the success of the Salinas administration. Eventually, 
though, a real democracy must run the Mexican government. American 
pressures for democracy will only grow in the future, as will pressure 
from opposition political parties such as the National Action Party (PAN), 
the second minority party in Mexico (Wood, "Primitive Politics" Sll). 
A new democracy could bring instabilities, but the greatest 
strength of NAFfA, and other economic accords like it, is its stability. 
What NAFfA brings to Mexico and other developing countries, as seen in 
Spain and Portugal, is an institutionalized set of economic regulations 
and guidelines that provide a path to economic liberalization. In 
addition, it serves as a restraint to the government, taking economic 
policy out of the hands of administrations, whose policy could ebb and 
flow with the mood of the electorate. 
The European Community tackled these factors in Spain and 
Portugal, and NAFfA will most likely have the same effect on Mexico. 
Tne determination of the people and the government of Mexico have 
made liberalizations all but a reality, as evidenced through the speed 
with which it has changed directions and opened its doors to the outside. 
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